The horofunction boundary of the Hilbert geometry

We investigate the horofunction boundary of the Hilbert geometry defined on an arbitrary finite-dimensional bounded convex domain D. We determine its set of Busemann points, which are those points that are the limits of `almost-geodesics'. In addition, we show that any sequence of points converging to a point in the horofunction boundary also converges in the usual sense to a point in the Euclidean boundary of D. We prove that all horofunctions are Busemann points if and only if the set of extreme sets of the polar of D is closed in the Painleve-Kuratowski topology.Comment: 24 pages, 2 figures; minor changes, examples adde

Existence of positive solutions of a superlinear boundary value problem with indefinite weight

We deal with the existence of positive solutions for a two-point boundary value problem associated with the nonlinear second order equation $u''+a(x)g(u)=0$. The weight $a(x)$ is allowed to change its sign. We assume that the function $g\colon\mathopen{[}0,+\infty\mathclose{[}\to\mathbb{R}$ is continuous, $g(0)=0$ and satisfies suitable growth conditions, so as the case $g(s)=s^{p}$, with $p>1$, is covered. In particular we suppose that $g(s)/s$ is large near infinity, but we do not require that $g(s)$ is non-negative in a neighborhood of zero. Using a topological approach based on the Leray-Schauder degree we obtain a result of existence of at least a positive solution that improves previous existence theorems.Comment: 12 pages, 4 PNG figure

Perspectives on the Missiological Legacy of Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation

Upon the occasion of the 500th anniversary Martin Luther’s publication of his 95 theses, this composite article brings together five perspectives on the missiological legacy of the reformer and the subsequent Protestant Reformation. The blend of voices makes clear that Luther and the subsequent Protestant Reformation do not have a simple missiological legacy but rather various legacies: theological, ecclesiological, political, and practical; some of which co-exist, and even collide, in the same ecclesiastical community. The scandalous legacy of a splintered and splintering church remains. Yet, demonstrations of mutual recognition, reciprocal respect, and genuine fellowship can be found in certain missiological circles

Ten myths about character, virtue and virtue education – plus three well-founded misgivings

Initiatives to cultivate character and virtue in moral education at school continue to provoke sceptical responses. Most of those echo familiar misgivings about the notions of character, virtue and education in virtue – as unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic, conservative, individualistic, relative and situation dependent. I expose those misgivings as ‘myths’, while at the same time acknowledging three better-founded historical, methodological and practical concerns about the notions in question

Isomorphism of graph classes related to the circular-ones property

We give a linear-time algorithm that checks for isomorphism between two 0-1 matrices that obey the circular-ones property. This algorithm leads to linear-time isomorphism algorithms for related graph classes, including Helly circular-arc graphs, \Gamma-circular-arc graphs, proper circular-arc graphs and convex-round graphs.Comment: 25 pages, 9 figure

Virtue and austerity

Virtue ethics is often proposed as a third way in health-care ethics, that while consequentialism and deontology focus on action guidelines, virtue focuses on character; all three aim to help agents discern morally right action although virtue seems to have least to contribute to political issues, such as austerity. I claim: (1) This is a bad way to characterize virtue ethics. The 20th century renaissance of virtue ethics was first proposed as a response to the difficulty of making sense of ‘moral rightness’ outside a religious context. For Aristotle the right action is that which is practically best; that means best for the agent in order to live a flourishing life.There are no moral considerations besides this. (2) Properly characterized, virtue ethics can contribute to discussion of austerity. A criticism of virtue ethics is that fixed characteristics seem a bad idea in ever-changing environments; perhaps we should be generous in prosperity, selfish in austerity. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that people indeed do change with their environment. However, I argue that virtues concern fixed values not fixed behaviour; the values underlying virtue allow for different behaviour in different circumstances: in austerity, virtues still give the agent the best chance of flourishing. Two questions arise. (a) In austere environments might not injustice help an individual flourish by, say, obtaining material goods? No, because unjust acts undermine the type of society the agent needs for flourishing. (b) What good is virtue to those lacking the other means to flourish? The notion of degrees of flourishing shows that most people would benefit somewhat from virtue. However, in extreme circumstances virtue might harm rather than benefit the agent: such circumstances are to be avoided; virtue ethics thus has a political agenda to enable flourishing. This requires justice, a fortiori when in austerity

Educating for Autonomy: Liberalism and Autonomy in the Capabilities Approach

Martha Nussbaum grounds her version of the capabilities approach in political liberalism. In this paper, we argue that the capabilities approach, insofar as it genuinely values the things that persons can actually do and be, must be grounded in a hybrid account of liberalism: in order to show respect for adults, its justification must be political; in order to show respect for children, however, its implementation must include a commitment to comprehensive autonomy, one that ensures that children develop the skills necessary to make meaningful choices about whether or not to exercise their basic capabilities. Importantly, in order to show respect for parents who do not necessarily recognize autonomy as a value, we argue that the liberal state, via its system of public education, should take on the role of ensuring that all children within the state develop a sufficient degree of autonomy